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Lost in the Maze: Refugees and the Law
Moria Paz*
We live now amidst an unprecedented crisis of mobility. In response,
human rights and refugee law are focused on the rights of refugees. They
center protection around the definition of a “refugee” and the right of nonrefoulement. But this formal legal frame blurs an important distinction
between two different types of claims that refugees make for protection—
those grounded in a right to remain (continuity) and those grounded in a
right to entry. I demonstrate that, in recent years, a few important legal
decisions have effectively expanded the protection of those refugees who
ground their claims in continuity, but not those making claims for entry.
Alas, the latter make up the majority of refugees today. And so, however
welcome these legal developments, the human rights regime remains
inadequate to address a worsening humanitarian crisis. At best, I show
that the current international legal regime has lost touch with the real
world; at worst, it compounds the crisis of most refugees today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Council
(“UNHRC”) estimated that about 80 million people were displaced
(roughly equal to the population of Germany or Iran) and 26.4 million
were refugees (approximately the population of Taiwan or New
Zealand).1 They are on the run. Women and men struggle along roads,
children wade through ocean surf, and the elderly trudge across the
desert. In the face of this massive crisis of mobility and displacement—
the largest in recorded history2—the practitioners of human rights and
refugee law have sharpened their focus on rights as the solution.3 Much
hinges on the legal definition of a refugee,4 and on the idea of
“returning.”5 Under human rights law, refugees bear rights to return to
their “own country” without being persecuted there,6 while under
refugee law they enjoy rights not to be forced to return to their “own
country” (non-refoulement)7 if they risk persecution.8 These returns
1 Refugee Data Finder, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, https://www.unhcr.org/
refugee-statistics/ (last updated Nov. 10, 2021). Obviously, this crisis is not new.
Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker’s Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 619 (2000) (“It is becoming trite to observe that in recent years few
issues have been as wrenching or as intractable as the refugee crisis.”).
2 Figures at a Glance, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY (June 18, 2021), https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.
3 See generally RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (James C. Hathaway ed.,
1997) (discussing, inter alia, states of reception’s legal obligation to provide refugees
some form of durable protection where safe repatriation is impossible).
4 Vincent Chetail, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of
the Relations Between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
IMMIGRATION 19, 23–24 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed., 2014) (citing U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on
Statelessness & Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.2 (Jan. 26, 1950) (statement of
Mr. Leslie of Canada)).
5 Some of the other guiding principles of human rights law include nondiscrimination, prevention of arbitrary detention, right to family life and the best
interests of the child, and prohibition of collective expulsion. Refugee law, in turn,
envisions in addition to return two other paths: resettlement, and domestic integration.
6 Importantly, this return to “own country” right is applicable to all humans. G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, art. 13, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization of African Unity, African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 12, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 218
[hereinafter African Charter].
7 Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
8 Id.; African Charter, supra note 6, at art. 12. Most general human rights treaties
have been construed by their respective treaty bodies as inferring an implicit
prohibition of refoulement, which derives from the general prohibition of torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1989); U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted By Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Note by the
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are stacked: refugee law comes into play only after the state of origin
has failed to fulfill its human rights duties toward its citizens.9
Important scholarship challenges the narrowness and incompleteness
of this rights approach under human rights and refugee law, suggesting
expanded definitions for refugees10 and the development of new rights
for their protection.11
Secretariat, Art. 7, General Comment 20, Hum. Rts. Comm., HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, ¶ 2 (Vol.
I) (1992); U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, ¶¶ 26 ̶ 27, U.N.
Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005). At the same time, the cessation clause, Article 1C
of the Refugee Convention, creates a right of return to one’s own country. See U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application (Apr. 26,
1999).
9 HATHAWAY, supra note 3, at 5 (Refugee law appears as “a remedial or palliative
branch of human rights law.”); Chetail, supra note 4, at 70 (“[C]ompared to human rights
law, the Geneva Convention has much more to receive than to give.”). On the
development of the non-refoulement obligation in human rights law territorially, see
generally JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007)
and the sources cited therein. See also Chetail, supra note 4, at 23–24, n.22 (citing U.N.
GAOR, 21st mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.21 (Nov. 26, 1951); James C. Hathaway &
R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 160 (1997).
10 For example, scholars have suggested the need to expand the definition of
refugees to include those impacted by climate change. See Bill Frelick, It Is Time to
Change the Definition of Refugee, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 28, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/28/it-time-change-definition-refugee. See, e.g., OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster & Jane
McAdam eds., 2021) for a general discussion on the scope of the definition of refugee;
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The International Law of Refugee Protection, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 44–45 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al.
eds., 2014); Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A
Multicultural View, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 35 (1989); MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEES 37 (2001) (“The qualification laid down by the Convention for being entitled
to claim asylum is too restrictive . . . .”).
11 See E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect
Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 746 (2015) (discussing a new, non-coercive use of the
existing international doctrine of the responsibility to protect (“RtoP”) to facilitate
international refugee cost-sharing); Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for
Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
53 (2016). For more on how the desire to treat migration in economic terms interacts
with other developments in immigration policy, see CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, THE NEW
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND THE END OF SETTLER SOCIETIES (2016). For the shortcomings of
the existing system of refugee protection and potential alternatives, see generally,
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster & Jane
McAdam eds., 2021). Another body of work goes the opposite route, focusing not on the
narrowness of the rights-based system of refugee protection, but rather on the “dark
side” of its progressive expansion in terms of both definitions of who is entitled to
refugee-law protection and the development of complementary protection in human
rights law. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, The Unintended Consequences of Expanding Migrant
Rights Protections, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 487 (2017). For a discussion of human rights more
generally, see Ralph Wilde, The Extraterritorial Application of International Human
Rights Law on Civil and Political Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
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But this rights approach is misguided. Human rights and refugee
law focus on formal juridical principles, including the criteria for
protection (the definition of a refugee), the content of entitlement (the
right of non-refoulment), and the process of protection (refugee status
determination, evidential requirements, etc.). This focus, however,
obscures the relative inadequacy of these legal regimes to respond to
the current crisis from the get-go: while they create a very clear body of
right holders, they do not impose a corresponding obligation or duty on
receiving states. Today, this asymmetry—clear rights but only a vague
sense against whom these rights might be enforced—leaves human
rights and refugee law quite distanced from the lived reality of most
refugees on the ground.
This Article advances this argument in four parts. Part II
introduces two types of claims that refugees make: those grounded in
continuity and those grounded in entry. The former concerns the legal
status of individuals who lost status in their “own country.” An example
is the recent decision of India to effectively strip two million people of
their citizenship in the State of Assam.12 These women and men seek to
regain their status in India. The latter, in turn, are about the status of
individuals who have fled their “own country” because it has either
turned into the cause of their harm or is unable to remedy their harm.
Here, an example is Syrian refugees who want to escape their “own
country.”13 This Article suggests that these two claims—grounded in
continuity or in entry—also differ in terms of (i) the relevant duty
holder and (ii) the nature of the crisis involved.
Parts III and IV draw on a descriptive analysis of human rights
doctrines and jurisprudence to illustrate the uneven development of the
law in response to these two types of claims. I focus on human rights, as
it offers the normative basis of protection. In addition, while refugee
law has been internalized in various ways in national law, it is neither

RIGHTS 635 (2013); THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL 3 (2011); Moria Paz, Between the
Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 1 (2016); Moira Paz, The Law of Walls, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 601 (2017) [hereinafter
Walls]; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Moving Beyond the Refugee Law Paradigm, 111 AJIL UNBOUND
8 (2017); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Undocumented Migrants and the Failures of Universal
Individualism, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 699 (2014).
12 Suhasini Raj & Jeffrey Gettleman, A Mass Citizenship Check in India Leaves 2 Million
People in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/
world/asia/india-muslim-citizen-list.html.
13 Of course, in real life this division is not rigid, and so some Syrians might also like
to return to their “own country,” while some of the women and men from Assam, if given
an opportunity, might opt for entry to another country.
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interpreted nor enforced through any international court.14 I show that
human rights have evolved in a way that has expanded possibilities for
refugees who ground their claims in continuity and ask to remain or
return.15 But human rights law remains relatively unresponsive to
those refugees who anchor their claims in entry—i.e., those who
escaped their “own” state and are making claims to be admitted into
another state with which they have no pre-existing ties.16
The discrepancy in the legal treatment of these two groups is a
function of the duty involved. The claim of refugees who seek
continuity—a minority of refugees today—operates like law: it applies
to an obvious state that carries a duty to honor their right.17 Using case
law, this Article describes the way human rights courts and other
enforcement bodies have expanded the spectrum of juridical definitions
of the state of “continuity.” In contrast, the claim of refugees who seek
entry—the overwhelming share of refugees today—identify no
particular state as a duty-holder.18 Without a further level of treaty
negotiation to assign entry rights to specific duty-holders, international
litigation marks a ceiling in their cases. Juridical principals in a formal
sense do not actually recognize or adequately address their
predicament. And so, in the case of refugees who lost substantive
protection (entry), outcomes are ultimately dependent on the
immigration policies of individual states.19 Admission decisions are
made for soft reasons of altruism (states agree to take in a “fair share”
of refugees; states take refugees in as objects of sympathy) or are
motivated by political impulses (states admit those in their selfinterest), but do not result from any international legal obligations that
restrict the actions of states irrespective of their consent. In that sense,
human rights law is becoming ever less adequate to address the current
crisis of refugees and of refugee mobility.

14 An exception to this is Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266 (Nov.
20). There is also caselaw by ECtHR, I-ACtHR and CJEU regarding asylum and/or
refugees. This is discussed throughout this Article.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED
IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1919) (stating that a legal relationship
involves a pair of persons whose interests exist on opposing sides).
18 For an earlier articulation of this argument, see Hersch Lauterpacht’s critiques of
refugee law. H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 354, 373 (1948) (“[T]here is a right to ‘seek’ asylum, without any assurance that
the seeking will be successful.”).
19 See Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and Citizens
in an Anxious Age, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457 (2020).
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There is one exception. Drawing on jurisprudence, I describe how
human rights adjudicatory bodies have created protection at the
margins of this system. Without creating a universal right of entry into
a non-consenting state, these enforcement bodies have expanded the
definition of “entry” such that it also includes non-nationals requesting
admission from a state in which they are physically present, or with
whose agents they have come into contact.20 Thus, if the individual’s
conduct is not culpable,21 there is a single state that is the duty-holder
by default, until it can identify another state to take its place. That state
cannot refoule the person if she qualified under the selective criteria.22
But these protections, however important, do not challenge the basic
structure of the international system: states retain nearly complete
control over their borders. And, moreover, this exception is also where
the accepted practice of using juridical rights in a formal sense reflects
complacency in today’s refugee and mobility crisis.
First, deriving a duty-holder from physical presence creates a
space for states to exploit: they can both avoid obligation (except in a
relatively limited way), and, at the same time, also claim that they are
20 At least under soft law, asylum seekers should not be rejected at the frontier. See,
e.g., Addendum to the Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees on Its Fifty-Second
Session, U.N. Doc.A/52/12/Add.1 (1997). This soft law interpretation is also supported
by state practices. Thus, for example, states in Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia
allowed large numbers of asylum seekers to cross their frontier and remain in the state
pending determination of refugee status. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (3d ed. 2011). This interpretation is also supported
by leading scholars. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 315 (2005) (“[T]he duty of non-refoulment . . . constrain not simply ejection from
within a state’s territory, but also non-admittance at its frontiers.”); see also C.W.
WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULMENT 49–52
(2009) (“Article 33 does not contain any geographical limitation” and “stopping a
refugee at the State’s borders . . . will not alter the applicability of Article 33(1) . . . .”).
But see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Freedom of Movement and Undocumented Migrants, 51 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 173, 177–80 (2016) (arguing that refugees or asylum seekers are explicitly
denied right to enter a state in order to seek asylum). For a comprehensive analysis of
the application of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention to the situation of rejection at
the frontiers, see GREGOR NOLL, NEGOTIATING ASYLUM: THE EU ACQUIS, EXTRATERRITORIAL
PROTECTION AND THE COMMON MARKET OF DEFLECTION 423–31 (2000). Additionally, regional
bodies prohibit collective expulsion of asylum seekers on the high seas. But this entry
is temporary and lasts only for the purpose of an individualized examination of their
applications for protection. See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, 47 (2012); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Expulsion of Aliens, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/L.797 (2012).
21 See N.D. & N.T. v. Spain, App. Nos. 8675/15 & 8697/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 34 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-177683; see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text. I discuss this in length later in this Article.
22 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status
Determination Under UNHCR’s Mandate (2005), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
42d66dd84.pdf.
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maintaining their commitments to human rights and the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.23 The law protects only
the small number of individuals who manage to establish access, but
states can erect barriers to prevent non-nationals from reaching their
territory.24 Second, even if some differentiation might be appropriate in
the protection of refugees, physical access selects for the wrong criteria.
Practically, it is random in relation to the seriousness of the predicament
of the individual. Moreover, it probably favors those who already enjoy
relative mobility. Normatively, physical presence, or accident of
geography, contradicts universality, which is a preeminent norm under
human rights law.25 Third, and finally, the alignment between physical
presence and duty also eliminates a legal responsibility in cases
involving the majority of refugees today (those unable to establish
access), replacing it instead with discretionary altruism.
The willful double blindness—the focus on formal rights to the
exclusion of duties, and to the distinction between formal loss of
belonging (continuity) and substantive loss of protection (entry)—is
today a matter of life and death for millions. It obscures the way that
human rights law fails most refugees who root their claim in entry. Part
V ends with policy-oriented suggestions for refugees today.
So, here we are at a very cynical place. Individual refugees bear
clear rights. States may agree that someone ought to do something for
the protection of refugees. But they are also legally free not to be that
someone. And so, on the ground, the majority of refugees are left
marooned on land, adrift at sea.

23 See ALISON MOUNTZ, THE DEATH OF ASYLUM: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE ENFORCEMENT
ARCHIPELAGO (2020) (discussing these actions in Australia); Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.
24 See Paz, Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, and
Border Walls, supra note 11.
25 For a classic articulation, see Louis Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of
Human Rights, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 10, 11 (1989) (“The term ‘human
rights’ suggests the rights of all human beings anywhere and anytime.”).
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II. A NEW FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY: CLAIMS GROUNDED IN CONTINUITY AND IN
ENTRY
Today, a variety of overlapping international instruments
guarantee a separate set of rights to certain qualified refugees.26 First,
in general, human rights law provides a right to return to one’s “own
country” without being persecuted there.27 The Human Rights
Committee declared that this right “is of the utmost importance for
refugees seeking repatriation.”28 It ensures both the voluntary nature
of repatriation, and the correlative duty of states of origin to admit their
nationals.
Second, refugees also have rights under the Geneva system not to
be forced to return to their “own country” so long as they risk
persecution. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, for example, forbids
the forced return of refugees to a place where there is well-founded fear
of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.”29 Recent developments
have expanded grounds of persecution, possibly including the effects of
a climate crisis.30
The two return rights are lumped together.31 Human rights is the
norm, for it creates rights that are universal (return to one’s “own
country” is by virtue of the dignity inherent in being a human being).32
26 E.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 1–2; African Charter, supra note 6,
at arts. 1–2.
27 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 13(2); ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 12(4). In contrast to
the non-binding character of the UDHR, the ICCPR is a binding human rights treaty.
28 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of
Movement) para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999).
29 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33(1). For other forms of protection and
non-refoulement, see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (preventing the real possibility of torture);
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (as amended
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14) (preventing “inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment”).
30 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, ¶ 9.11, U.N Doc.
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (advance unedited version) (Jan. 7, 2020). On climate
refugees, see, e.g., Matthew Lister, Climate Change Refugees, 17 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. &
POL. PHIL. 618 (2014).
31 It is now “virtually impossible to separate” human rights from refugee law.
Chetail, supra note 4, at 19, 23–24, 39–40, 68. For an earlier discussion of this
relationship, see Paul Weis, Refugees and Human Rights, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 35,
48–49 (1971).
32 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
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Refugee law, however, is selective in nature: the non-return to one’s
“own country” is limited in applicability to only a predetermined
category of protected persons.33 The latter law becomes applicable only
after the state of origin has failed to fulfill its duty of protection toward
one of its own citizens.34
Third, and finally, under the Refugee Convention, refugees can also
access a variety of rights in any country (other than their own) where
they are living. Once in that country or under its jurisdiction, they have
rights, at a minimum, to a core set of basic guarantees.35 “[A]dditional
entitlements are subordinated to the existence of a territorial bond with
the asylum state,” and to the nature of residency.36 But refugees do not
have the right to enter a particular country to which they would like to
flee.37
Crucially, and deliberately, neither human rights law nor the
refugee regime challenges the sovereign control of national borders.
The return right under human rights law creates a positive right for legal
entry across borders—entry that is obligatory on the state regardless of
consent.38 But this compulsory entry is limited to a single state (“own
country”). There is no universal entry39—human rights provides only a
vague proclamation of a universal right of asylum that lacks any

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add.13 (2004) (“[T]he enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to
citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of
nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers [and] refugees . . . who may find
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.”); see also
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 15: Position of Aliens Under the Covenant,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
33 Meaning, those who are persecuted on account of predetermined grounds.
Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1(A)(2); Chetail, supra note 4, at 22 (“[H]uman
rights law is the primary source of refugee protection, while the Geneva Convention is
bound to play a complementary and secondary role.”).
34 HATHAWAY, supra note 20 (Refugee law appears as “a remedial or palliative branch
of human rights law.”).
35 For example, prohibition of discrimination, free access to domestic courts,
rationing, primary education, fiscal equality, and more. See, e.g., Refugee Convention,
supra note 7, at arts. 3, 16(1), 20, 22(1) & 29.
36 Chetail, supra note 4, at 41. There are different ways of classifying these
entitlements. See id.; HATHAWAY, supra note 20, at 121.
37 See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33; Convention Against Torture,
supra note 29; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 45, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 278.
38 Of course, a state had to consent to be bound by the particular treaty in the first
place. In the alternative, an obligation can be binding on a state irrespective of its
consent if there is opinio juris (sense of legal obligation) and a sufficiently general
practice of states that do not persistently object to the treaty. UDHR, supra note 6, at art.
13, ¶ 2; ICCPR, supra note 6, at art 12, ¶ 2.
39 See discussion infra, Part III.
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correlative obligation of admission.40 The non-refoulment right under
the Geneva system, in turn, postulates a negative duty not to return
individuals to persecution.41 This protection is a narrow exception, not
a fundamental challenge to the basic ideas of national sovereignty and
borders. It squares with the narrow ambition of refugee law—the nonreturn duty does not target international migration, including the
cumulative effects of deteriorating conditions that leave individuals
with no choice other than escape.
This orthodoxy focuses on the formal rights of refugees. It lumps
together separate types of claims that refugees make for protection, and
that ought to be differentiated: those grounded in continuity and those
grounded in entry. And by claims, I mean here Weberian ideal types: no
claim made by a refugee precisely corresponds with either of my two
ideal types, and many claims combine elements from both.42 These two
types of claims involve individuals who seek refuge, and both implicate
border-crossing, but they are, in fact, distinguishable in two key ways.
To begin with, a continuity-based claim concerns the legal status of
individuals for whom changes in sovereignty destabilize status at home.
This claim is backward-looking and is about the right to remain. It is
made by refugees against their homeland: they ask to remain or to
return to their “own country.” The substantive content of this claim, or
its foundation, inheres in belonging, and concerns a legal relationship
between a state and one of its own.
A continuity-based claim varies in degree. A thin claim is about a
forceful dispossession of status. Remedy here entails protection from
deportation, and does not involve border crossing (for example, the
claim of the women and men from the State of Assam). A thicker
continuity claim involves deportation post-dispossession. In this case,
the remedy does implicate border-crossing. It attaches a remaining
function to a return function. One example is the decision of the United
Kingdom to revoke citizenship and deny the right of return to British
national women who left to marry Islamic State fighters.43 These
women need both a right to return to the United Kingdom and also a
right to remain there, including some sort of status regularization. The
difference in protection is a matter of degree. A thick continuity claim
40 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 14 (“Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”).
41 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7.
42 See Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in GESAMMELTE
WERKE 146 (1968); H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, Introduction, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGY 3, 59–61 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
43 Karla Adam, Shamima Begum, Teenager Who Joined ISIS, To Lose UK Citizenship,
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/2LTH-K4DL.
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involves a right to cross the border into one’s “own country.” It is “thick”
because it entails two functions: to remain but also to return.
In addition to those individuals from the State of Assam who were
made stateless by India, other examples include naturalized citizens in
the United States whose citizenship was recently revoked;44 Haitians
who were forcibly deported from the Dominican Republic;45 and noncitizen long-term domiciliaries in countries such as Canada, France and
Tanzania, whose status was withdrawn after criminal conviction or
suspicion regarding their residency statuses. Continuity-based claims
in my typology include claims by (i) refugees, (ii) those threatened by
statelessness (whether they fled destabilized territories or remained
within them), and also (iii) individuals who carry nationality in a state
different than the one where they have established a longstanding
habitual residence and who do not qualify under strict refugee
definitions.
A claim to enter, by contrast, is made by refugees who want to go
to any state but their own state. It is about the legal status of individuals
who seek to escape their “own country,” either because it is the source
of their persecution or because the state is willing but unable (or able
but unwilling) to prevent the persecution.46 This claim is forwardlooking; it concerns mobility, or the right to exit one’s state and settle in
another, and deals with the unavailability or the ineffectiveness of one’s
“own country.”47 In a way, then, claims based on entry are made when
claims based on continuity are no longer available.48
Entry claims include claims made by claimants who are both (i)
refugees sensu stricto who fall under different formal legal definitions
(thus, including those who flee war and who are refugees under the
African Convention but not the 1951 Convention);49 (ii) individuals who
44 Seth Freed Wessler, Is Denaturalization the Next Front in the Trump
Administration’s War on Immigration?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/magazine/naturalized-citizenship-immigrationtrump.html.
45 HUM. RTS. WATCH, “ILLEGAL PEOPLE”: HAITIANS AND DOMINICO-HAITIANS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 3 (2002) [hereinafter HAITIAN CTRS. COUNCIL], https://www.hrw.org/reports/
2002/domrep/domrep0402.pdf.
46 This includes also preventing the real possibility of torture and/or “inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” See European Convention, supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
47 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1(C) (the “cessation clause”). The
refugee regime, importantly, also includes a claim of continuity.
48 See Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] 1 A.C. 489, 508 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“Another state is to provide a surrogate protection
where protection is not available in the home state.”).
49 African Charter, supra note 6, at art. 2.
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are treated as de facto refugees if they escape their “own country” where
they faced the real possibility of torture;50 and (iii) individuals who do
not fall strictly within refugee categories but who are in the same dire
situation of being forced to escape deteriorating conditions. This
includes those fleeing unsettled political conditions, war zones, civil
wars, environment degradation, or other causes of large-scale forced
migration.51
Claims grounded in continuity and those grounded in entry not
only concern distinct types of crises, they also point to different dutyholders (against whom the individual makes this claim). A continuitybased claim points in the direction of one particular state, the
individual’s own country, as a duty-holder. This duty can be thin and
negative (not to deport), or thick and positive (to let back in). Only if the
duty is positive does it involve border crossing and, in that case, it
restricts the control of this one state over its borders. This is in line with
an international human rights regime which is both jurisdiction-based
and protects the right to nationality52 (and also legal personality).
A claim to enter, in contrast, derives from flat-out suffering and
places an entry duty at the doorstep of all states that signed the relevant
treaty. This conforms to refugee law which, strictly speaking, protects
those who are persecuted at home. As a category, they are outside the
human rights protection of their “own country.”
Here, the remedy always involves border-crossing.53 It imposes a
negative duty on one state (to let go), and a positive duty on all other
states (to let in). This claim, therefore, limits the control of every state
over its borders.
Of course, in real life, this division is not rigid. Individuals who
make continuity-based claims might at the same time also need to make
entry-based ones. In addition, often the range of human motivations to
cross borders resists a clear disentanglement into neat doctrinal
categories. Palestinian refugees, for example, occupy an intermediate
position in my typology: they are both individuals who raise continuityConvention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 3.
Claims grounded in entry might possibly also include temporary Protected Status
holders who entered and are seeking the right to remain. But their claims are directed
against one specific host state.
52 On the jurisdictional base, see, e.g., Samantha Besson, Due Diligence and
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations – Mind the Gap!, 9 EURO. SOC’Y INT’L L.
REFLECTIONS (2020). On the link to nationality, see UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 15; ICCPR,
supra note 6, at art. 1, 24(3); LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, THE MOVEMENT OF
PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS 39 (1992).
53 Even resettlement, a remedy which may be granted before border crossing,
ultimately requires exiting one state and entering another.
50
51
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based claims because their status in Palestine has been upset, and also
refugees in the strict legal sense who have crossed a border and sought
asylum post dispossession (e.g., Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan,
etc.). Yet separating these two claims as distinct ideal types is still
valuable, for it directs attention towards the latent tendencies within
human rights and refugee law that leave one subset of refugees without
a clear path to adjudication.
III. CLAIMS GROUNDED IN CONTINUITY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, 1948–2020
I now turn to argue that human rights law—the regime that sets
the norm of protection—has developed in ways that more readily
recognize continuity-based claims (return). I look at the freedom of
movement right, for it is the human right that most explicitly involves
cross-border mobility54 and thus directly bears on the lives of refugees.
I illustrate that, within the history of the human right to freedom of
movement, “own country” has taken on a range of more- or lessexpansive juridical definitions, and generated different degrees of
protection. The protection offered does not correlate with the actual
neediness of the claimant. Instead, it is a function of the nature of the
claim she makes: a claim that derives protection from a relationship to
“own country” or the breakdown of that relationship.
The freedom of movement right under the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) generated a right both to return
and also to remain therein. It involves two functions: exit and entry.55
The exit function is always in effect. It is universal and unlimited:
anyone can leave any country. This is confirmed by both the UDHR56 (an
aspirational document, sometimes viewed as codifying customary law,
but one that is formally non-binding) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (a treaty binding on its signatories).57
As for the entry function, it is limited only to an individual who returns
to “his own” country.58
54 The other two human rights that assume mobility are the right to seek asylum and
the right to nationality.
55 I am looking here only at the international aspect of the right to freedom of
movement (i.e., mobility across states).
56 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 13, ¶ 2 (“Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own . . . .”).
57 ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 12, ¶ 2 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.”).
58 UDHR, supra note 6, at art. 13, ¶ 2; ICCPR, supra note 6; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(d)(ii), Dec. 21, 1965, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
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In this 1948 configuration, “own country” is equated with the state
of formally-prescribed nationality. In other words, the right to
movement derives protection from a legal-political tie with the state
(citizenship). Thus, while all individuals enjoy a universal exit, a right
of entry is particular and limited only to nationals.
This right sanctions legal movement that is obligatory on a state
irrespective of consent.59 It guarantees a thick protection, to remain and
to return. But it limits this protection to citizens. Aside from this
exception, human rights law omits border crossing as a formative part
of the regime.60
Human rights are centered on the state as the site of correction, and
offer protection contingent on a certain threshold of “belonging” to a
state. The definition of juridical “belonging” here assumes a legalpolitical significance (citizenship) that carries protective outcome.
Consider, again, the Assam example. In the eyes of India, these two
million women and men were not entitled to citizenship in the first
place,61 and are therefore outside the reach of the freedom of movement
right under the 1948 articulation. Because the right makes protection a
function of nationality, it does not sanction freedom of movement as
such. Instead, it sanctions movement limited by nationality. Hence, the
paradox articulated by Hannah Arendt:62 human rights are supposed to
be universal,63 but the right to freedom of movement puts nationality
back at the center of protection. The 1948 right of return is, in fact, an
expression of freedom of movement that belongs only to citizens.
In recent years, human rights courts and quasi-judicial institutions
have stretched the definition of “own country” to include both
nationality and long-standing residency. In this articulation, longstanding residency supplies the connecting criteria that determine

Of course, the treaties are consent-based. See discussion, supra note 38.
For example, in his book on the origins and drafting of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Johannes Morsink treats separately as ‘special’ the provisions on
departure from and return to a country, asylum, and nationality because they were not
ordinarily found in domestic constitutions and depended on more than one state.
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND
INTENT 72–73 (2000). For more on this, see Karen Knop, Lorimer’s Private Citizens of the
World, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 463 (2016). For the evolution of the international legal
regulation of mobility, see Jane McAdam, An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement
in International Law: The Right to Leave as a Personal Liberty, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 27
(2011).
61 Raj and Gettleman, supra note 12.
62 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296–97 (1958).
63 UDHR, supra note 6, at Preamble (“[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . . “).
59
60
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whether an individual without citizenship can claim a state as her “own.”
And so, for example, the UNHRC decided that Canada was the “own
country” in the case of a non-national Somali man who had entered at
the age of four. The Committee held that he had “close and enduring
connections” in Canada.64 The Committee used the extensive emotional
links that the man formed with Canada over a long period of time to
substitute for nationality.65
This is the most mobility that these courts and quasi-judicial
institutions could introduce into an international legal regime that takes
for granted a certain stasis, that assumes that individuals already belong
to the legitimate jurisdiction of some state, and that respects states’
sovereign control over borders.66 It is a law that forsakes mobility as
formative, and disavows attachments and belonging shaped by the
experience of migration. After this expansion, if India deports the two
million individuals from Assam, those individuals will qualify for a
return to their “own country” under the human right to freedom of
movement. Inherent in the revised legal form is the expiration of
protection if personal-territorial continuity in the state breaks down.
What about the status of the children of deportees, born postdispossession and deportation? The inheritance of refugee claims by
multiple generations that have not been given a new nationality is
hypothetical in the Assam case, but it is the reality for Palestinian
refugees. Today, Palestinians are two, three, and even four generations
removed from the original dispossession. Their example is illustrative:
because of the intergenerational nature of their crisis, different
generations of Palestinians make different claims that relate to different
variations of belonging and of “own state.”
The legitimacy of the claims of the children of Palestinians who
were expelled in 1948 or 1967, and the reality of the harm they have
suffered, calls for a further expansion of “own country.” This expansion
equates “own country” with a mix of traditions, customs, and ethnicity
(descent). Here, the proxy for return to “own country” is long-standing

64 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Warsame v. Canada, Comm. No. 1959/2010, ¶¶ 8.4, 8.5,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010 (July 21, 2011); see also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Nystrom v. Australia, Comm. No. 1557/2007, ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1557/
2007 (July 18, 2011). These communications do not rule on a refugee status. Instead,
they concern circumstances similar to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, or European caselaw on deportation of “second generation” non-nationals.
65 Warsame, supra note 64, ¶ 8.5.
66 As Michael Walzer famously put it, “[a]dmission and exclusion are at the core of
communal independence.” MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 61–62 (1983). For the opposite view, see generally Joseph H. Carens, Aliens
and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 251 (1987).
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territorial ties through culture and ancestry. This proxy would allow
descended generations of Palestinian refugees a return to Israel, a state
with which they never had physical continuity but from which their
grandparents or other ancestors were forcibly expelled and
dispossessed.
Ironically, there is a legal precedent that might be relevant for such
an expansion: British Mandate over Palestine.67 In cases involving Jews,
the Mandate made a right to nationality a function of the “historical
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine.”68 And so, “historical
connection” with a territory, not physical presence, acted here as a
proxy for juridical belonging. This belonging, moreover, was neither to
a state nor to a place of ongoing domestic and economic roots. Rather,
it was to a territory of spiritual value, a “National Home.”69 It generated
a thicker degree of protection than others we have explored thus far,
including three functions: to return, to remain, and to a Mandate
nationality.70 Importantly, I do not look here at the Jewish National
Home as a generally accepted precedent that can generate new legal
claims,71 but rather to suggest the broad spectrum of “own country”
interpretations that might be possible if we extend our imagination.
So far, my functional analysis of the human right to freedom of
movement suggests that the term “own country” takes on a spectrum of
more or less expansive juridical definitions. It can mean: (1) the place
of ongoing domestic and economic roots; (2) the state of formally
prescribed nationality; and (3) the state of longstanding residency; or
perhaps also (4) the state, or the place, of long-standing territorial ties
through ancestry. And it also illustrates that a return right can generate
different degrees of protection from the minimum of belonging. It can

67 British Mandate for Palestine, in THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/palmanda.asp.
68 See id. at Preamble (“[T]he Mandatory should be responsible for . . . the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people . . . .”); id. at art. 7.
See also The Balfour Declaration (Nov. 2, 1917). Palestinian nationality was regulated
by the Palestine Citizenship Order, 1925, S.R. & O., no. 2.
69 British Mandate for Palestine, supra note 67, at Preamble (“[T]he grounds for
reconstituting their national home in that country . . . .”). In 1922, the precise content of
“National Home” remained underspecified. See MICHAEL BRENNER, IN SEARCH OF ISRAEL: THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA, ch. 3 (2018); DMITRY SHUMSKY, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: THE ZIONIST
POLITICAL IMAGINATION FROM PINSKER TO BEN-GURION, ch. 1–5 (2018).
70 British Mandate for Palestine, supra note 67, at art. 7; Palestine Citizenship Order,
supra note 68.
71 On the question of whether colonialism ended, see Legal Consequences of the
Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, 2019
I.C.J. 118, ¶ 88 (Feb. 25, 2019).
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include just a single function (to remain). And it can also assume two
functions (to return and to remain with some status).
One might support an expansion of “own country.” As a structural
matter, it is within a rights framework and locates a duty-holder in one
obvious state. Furthermore, it legally captures continuities in a state
outside the simplest instance of ongoing personal-territorial continuity.
Such an expansion could incorporate moral continuities by
recognizing claims associated with the injustices of colonialism, opening
a route to draw on border-crossing as a remedy for ongoing
dispossession. Thus, for example, economic migrants from what were
colonized territories could potentially have claims for national
admissions and inclusion in European states.72 Further, “own country”
could expand to include political continuities by allowing legal
designation of a homeland that is different from a formal state, to cover
situations that involve a return to the same physical territory but under
different political control. The former can better capture indigenous
claims. For instance, in cases involving indigenous communities, the
land, not the state, could be legally recognized as home. Indeed, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights is moving in this direction.73 The
latter might legally denote the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Turkey now demands to repatriate them to Syria, or the state of their
nationality, but to a region under Turkish control. Finally, such an
expansion could also include border crossers—mainly indigenous—
who are exercising a freedom of movement that is outside and
independent of state dispensation.74
In thinking about incorporation into a claim for protection
elements of continuity with one specific state, one can defer to existing
international caselaw that consider parameters of belonging. And so,
for example, in the landmark Nottebohm Case, the International Court of
Justice performed precisely this analysis to find that claims to having a
home, rather than a formal legal-political allegiance, can define
nationality.75

72 See generally E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV.
1509 (2019) (migration as a form of decolonialization).
73 See Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ X (June 15, 2005) (Court equated
between returning to “land” to returning “home” post-massacre.).
74 For a discussion of the idea of indigenous mobility outside the state, see Sherally
Munshi, Race, Geography, and Mobility, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245 (2016).
75 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J 4, 22 (Apr.
6) (Nationality must be “real and effective,” in the sense of “correspond[ing] with the
factual situation.”).
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Or one might reject such expansions—for there is no obvious way
in which a regime that forgoes mobility as formative can accommodate
claims that create positive entry obligations. The human rights
framework, we saw, restricts the action of states relative to their own
“nationals.” It assumes that individuals already belong to the
jurisdiction of a state and guarantees them the ability to exercise rights
against that state. This law cannot readily tolerate expanding the notion
of “own country” to include (subjective) emotional links, let alone
cultural references. Such an expansion may leave states owing an entry
duty to an unspecified number of individuals from all around the world.
This possibility risks upending the state system and diluting the value
of nationality, a central pillar of the international system.
Indeed, pushed to the extreme, the expansion of “own country”
might unravel nationality doctrines all together. Under the existing
system, political “belonging” is only to a (territorial) sovereign state,
with boundaries of both inclusion (“us”) and exclusion (“them”)
determined by national criteria and set by state law.76 Drawing on
moral continuity to generate “own country” (e.g., to fight the injustices
of colonialism) might transform nationality from a mode of political
belonging that is fixed by state law to one that is determined to a large
degree by individuals from outside the state. These women and men
might be connected to the state through history but share no political
loyalty to the existing state and its institutions.77 Finally, once the door
is opened to a more expansive definition of “own country” somewhere
in the international system, it might be difficult to reject it outright
elsewhere in the system.
Whether one supports or rejects this expansion of “own country,”
the law here is relatively settled. It dictates an obvious duty-holder, and
this duty-holder is responsible for the harm (thus, creating a legal

76 Id. at 23 (“[I]nternational law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules
governing the grant of its own nationality.”). This state-based definition of nationality
is supported by human rights law. See, e.g., General Comment No. 15, supra note 32.
77 This Treaty served as the model for the other Minority Treaties signed with the
new states born after WWI. Art 4(1) of the Polish Minority Treaty forced new states to
give members of minority who stratified two conditions—principle of habitual
residence and the principle of origin—nationality. Minorities Treaty Between the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 412
(“Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals . . . [members of a minority] who
were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of
the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident
there.”). Said the Permanent Court of International Justice: the duty on the state to grant
nationality operates “without attaching any importance to the political allegiance of
these persons.” Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 7, ¶ 25 (Sept. 15).
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relationship within Hohfeldian taxonomy).78 In cases that bear on “own
country,” courts and quasi-judicial bodies are asked to adjudicate the
nature of individuals belonging to one single state and not to distribute
obligations between states on an ad hoc basis. Resolving these claims
involves line-drawing and poses factual questions. International
enforcement bodies are well suited to these inquires. These claims are,
therefore, well-suited for a strategy of adjudication.
IV. CLAIMS GROUNDED IN ENTRY: THE LAW IS INSUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED
Even the strongest version of “own country” will not affect the
situation of refugees who are making claims to enter. I now turn to
suggest that a majority of today’s refugees are left without legal
recourse under human rights law because their claims do not
correspond to a clear duty-holder. By examining case law before human
rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies, I argue that a small subset of
these “entry” refugees might nonetheless be protected. Their protection
is a function of variants of access and is conditioned upon their ability
to establish presence at a state border or to come under its effective
control. But the equity, justice, or practical desirability of physicality as
a selective criterion is far from clear.
Claims to entry concern refugees who seek to flee their “own
country” because it is the source of their harm. Their demand is not to
belong, but rather to escape their country of formal nationality. This
desire for escape might be motivated by a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion . . . .”79 Or by “severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental” that “is intentionally inflicted on
a person . . . .”80 Or by fleeing a war zone.81 Or even by environmental
catastrophe,82 or slow political deterioration (not recognized by formal
law).
Regardless, the quest for mobility in these cases is a function of
suffering, not belonging. The claim is not to remain or return, but to
escape and to admit. And a meaningful escape requires the ability to
exit from one state and to be admitted into another.

HOHFELD, supra note 17.
Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1.
80 Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 1.
81 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (“OAU Convention”), art. 1(2), 10 September 1969, 1001
U.N.T.S. 45, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html.
82 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, U.N Doc. CCPR/C/127/
D/2728/2016, para. 9.11 (advance unedited version) (Jan. 7, 2020).
78
79
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But there is no universal right to cross-border movement.83
International law overwhelmingly respects sovereign authority over
borders. Pursuant to principles of sovereignty, every state has the
power to control its territory, and in some cases a duty to do so.84
Moreover, every state has the right to grant nationality on the terms it
wishes.85 Thus, a sovereign owes no entry duty to individuals it does
not consent to—even if they are peaceful, disadvantaged foreigners.86
Human rights law, as we have seen, qualifies this prerogative of the state
only in cases that involve a return of one of the state’s “own.”
Operating at the margins of this regime, human rights courts and
quasi-judicial bodies have begun in the past decade or so to enlarge
protection of non-nationals. They have expanded somewhat the range
of circumstances under which individuals are deemed to have
successfully entered the state by including both those who are
physically inside a country’s borders, and also those who have come
under the effective control of the state or its agents outside the state’s
borders.
For example, in Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012,87 the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held that when a state interdicts a boat on the
high seas carrying would-be migrants and asylum seekers, the very act
of interdiction through the human agency of the state brings the
passengers under the state’s control.88 This triggers procedural

Treaty instruments exclude a right of entry to their beneficiaries. See, e.g., Refugee
Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
45, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. For case law on the same point, see, e.g., HAITIAN CTRS.
COUNCIL, supra note 45; Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and Another, Ex
parte European Roma Rights Centre and Others, [2004] UKHL 55, para. 70.
84 See e.g., Case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (App. Nos. 8675/15 & 8697/15) (Grand
Chamber), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:0213JUD000867515, Council of Europe: European
Court of Human Rights, Feb. 13, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,
5e4691d54.html.
85 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr. 6) (“[I]nternational
law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules governing the grant of its own
nationality.”). Treaty instruments exclude a right of entry to their beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Refugee Convention, supra note 7, at art. 33; Convention Against Torture, supra note 29,
at art. 3; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 45, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
86 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 237 (1989) (“The state’s exclusive right to decide what acts shall take place in
its territory is virtually undisputed.”).
87 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 20.
88 Id. para. 74.
83
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protections for the passengers on the boat, including individual status
determination.89
Importantly, the ECtHR did not create a right of entry.90 Instead, it
stretched out the definition of entry so that it covers not only individuals
who are inside the state proper (jurisdiction is territorial),91 but also
those arriving at the state’s borders, or even at the functional
equivalents of borders (jurisdiction qua “effective control”).92 This
protection is thin and transitory. It lasts only insofar as needed for the
purpose of an individualized examination of applications for
protection93 (although, of course, individual status identification
processes would presumably enable more people to get into the state).
Much like the ECtHR, other human rights courts and instruments have
gone out of their way to clarify that they are not upsetting the policy of
state control over borders.94
Id. paras. 184–85.
In fact, the Grand Chamber affirmed: “Contracting States have the right . . . to
control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens . . . . [T]he right to political asylum
is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols.” Id. para. 113.
91 States’ obligations are rooted in the state’s overall control over territory. See
Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Judgment (preliminary objections), Feb. 23,
1995, para. 62.
92 Like the ECtHR, the UNHRC held that the state is responsible for protecting the
human rights of “all persons in their territory and all persons subject to their
jurisdiction.” UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of NonRefoulment Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and Its 1967 Protocol, para. 36 (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Application],
https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf. According to the UNHRC, the test for the
applicability of the law is not territorial presence, but effective control of the State. This
was confirmed by Article 2(1) of the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 2(1).
Extraterritorial application of human rights has been likewise supported by other
international human rights bodies and national courts. For a summary, Extraterritorial
Application, supra note 92, para. 36.
93 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 20. This was confirmed in Georgia v. Russia (I), App. No.
13255/07, para. 195 (July 3, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109231;
Affaire Sharifi et autres c. Italie et Grèce, App. No. 16643/09, (Oct. 21, 2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-147287; Affaire Khlaifia et autres c. Italie, App. No.
16483/12, para. 235 (Dec. 15, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170054.
94 E.g., G.A. Res. 40/144, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are
Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, art. 2 ¶ 1 (Dec. 13, 1985) (“Nothing in
this Declaration shall be interpreted as . . . restricting the right of any State to promulgate
laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their
stay . . . .”). For the European system, see also Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali
v. the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 & 9474/81, para. 67 (May 28,
1985); Boujlifa v. France, App. No. 25404/94, (Oct. 21, 1997), para. 42, http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58106; Boughanemi v. France, App. No. 22070/93, (Apr. 24,
1996), para. 42; Case of N. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 26565/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12
(2008). For the Inter-American system, see Convention Regarding the Status of Aliens
in the Respective Territories of the Contracting Parties, art. 1, Feb. 20, 1928, 132 L.N.T.S.
302.
89
90
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Here, then, human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies trigger
jurisdiction by physical presence and make the allocation of protection
dependent upon an individual’s ability to come close to a state or its
agents.95 This leaves the location of the plaintiff consequential for the
state power of exclusion. Normatively, the distinction between those
extended protection and those left without protection is not fully
justified. Human rights law claims universality, but here protection
extends to some individuals and not others and is not generalizable.96
As a policy matter, moreover, the proximity of a non-national to the state
is an odd way to prioritize between the interests of these two relevant
stakeholders. Furthermore, the incremental protections recognized by
human rights courts and treaty bodies in developing this access-based
compromise might actually decrease pressure for more fundamental
reforms of the international refugee regime.
Recently, the ECtHR clamped down on even this thin protection,
which is a function of physical presence. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, 2020,97
the Court subjected the duty of the state to offer individual status
determination to the culpable conduct of a non-national. Without a
precise definition of “culpable conduct,”98 the Court found that a state
owes no individual status determination to non-nationals who have not
made “use of the existing legal procedures for gaining lawful entry,”99
and instead choose behavior that places “themselves in jeopardy.”100
And so, after human rights enforcement bodies have incentivized nonnationals to undertake dangerous travel to establish presence, they also
penalize them for putting themselves in peril.101
All this begs the question: where does a law that lacks a universal
right to cross borders, and case law that draws on physical access to
extend protection, leave a refugee who makes a claim motivated by
entry?
In this case, before the refugee is able to take the perilous journey
to set foot in the territory of a host state or reach its borders, there is no
On this, see Walls, supra note 11.
Note, however, that important scholars offer a normative argument for granting
protection to those who are ‘here,’ see generally, important work by Linda Bosniak. E.g.,
Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW, 389, 403 (2007); see, e.g., AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT
LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2011).
97 See supra note 21.
98 Id. para. 231. A conduct that “places” the applicants “in jeopardy.”
99 Id. para. 231. For these available means to legal protection, see id. para. 212.
100 Id. para. 231.
101 For discussion of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, see Moria Paz, The Legal Reconstruction of
Walls: N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, 2017, 2020, 22 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 693, 711 (2020).
95
96
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clear nexus between the claim she makes and one particular dutyholder. Instead all states bear a universal and general duty, but no one
state owes a particular entry duty. In fact, all states have a right,
sometimes even a duty, to control their borders.
Consider the example of a Syrian refugee who is stopped in the
Mediterranean Sea before making contact with a potential host state. As
a Syrian, she qualifies as a refugee under the definition of the U.N.
Refugee Agency.102 But human rights jurisdiction in her case can neither
be presumed (territorial jurisdiction) nor established (jurisdiction qua
control). Absent a correlative relation, the condition for a human rights
duty to permit entry is not established against any one state in
particular. Instead, her entry-based claim imposes a duty on all states,
and all states share this duty equally.103 And so, resolving the claim of
this woman involves the allocation of burdens and of inequities to all
states. Those claims, therefore, are better suited to the realm of
negotiations, bilateral or multilateral agreements, and the political
arena.
This dynamic, then, displaces legal duties with altruism; any one
state can choose to be generous and admit this woman, but it does not
carry a duty to let her in. At the same time, it also reduces this woman
to an object of sympathy. She is torn from any actual legal protection
and is left instead with only a sentimental appeal to an unspecified
common humanity.104
The exception is, of course, if the Syrian woman in this example
reached the territory of a state and requested entry (strong
territoriality). Or, in the alternative, if she came within the effective
control of this state or its agents and requested this entry (neoterritoriality). In such cases, providing the woman’s conduct does not
qualify within the vague definition of “culpability” (recall N.D. and N.T.
v. Spain), there is a single state of jurisdiction that is the duty-holder by
default,105 until it can identify another state to take its place.
102 UNHCR, What Is a Refugee?, U.N. (2020), https://www.unrefugees.org/refugeefacts/what-is-a-refugee/.
103 For a general discussion of human rights jurisdiction for duty, see Besson, supra
note 52. On human rights “responsibilities,” see Samantha Besson, The Bearers of
Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights – A Quiet (R)Evolution, 32 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 244 (2015).
104 Munshi, supra note 74 (discussing children).
105 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 20, para. 74 (“Whenever the State through its agents
operating outside its territory exercises control and authority over an individual, and
thus jurisdiction . . . .”). The ECtHR has been reluctant to apply the ECHR outside the
territory of the Convention States, notably ECtHR, Bankovic & Others v. Belgium & 16
Other Contracting States, App. No. 52207/99, 11 B.H.R.C. 435, para. 59–80 (Dec. 12,
2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22099. Even in this case, however, the
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In this case, the woman’s physical location—her presence within
the state—triggers a duty that trumps the state’s control over its
territory. But territorial access is an odd way to sort out the policy
interests of the stakeholders involved. From the perspective of the
individual non-national, it selects for some physical, economic, and
locational features. From the perspective of the state, it burdens states
unequally. In cases dealing with states of equal capacity, the accident of
geography determines the protective burden: states with more easily
penetrable borders, or with unreliable or uncooperative neighbors, will
bear a heavier influx.
More complicated still are non-core cases, such as those involving
refugees who flee private persecutors (when the state is willing but
unable to prevent the persecution). For example, consider an individual
fleeing gang violence in Central America. In this situation, case law on
status determination is less clear. In the functional terms that I have
suggested, the claim is for protection by the individual’s “own country.”
In other words, it is a claim motivated by continuity. The inability of the
individual’s “own country” to grant this protection leads him to make an
entry claim on other states for refuge. Those other host states,
moreover, may approach the claim from the perspective of refugee
status determination, and may not see these cases as qualifying for
refugee treatment.106
In this case, the duty-holder is not clear in two separate ways. To
begin, is it the home state where the gang violence occurred, or the host
state that might take him in? And if it is not the home state, then what
particular state must offer refuge? Before this man—or woman—
reaches the territory of one state, there is no particular reason why any
one state should take him in. Without a particular duty-holder, his claim
for a legal status or an entitlement remains abstract.

Court concluded that “the ECtHR has consistently held that the obligations under the
ECHR apply extraterritorially in situations where ‘a State exercises through the effective
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad . . . . All or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that government,’” Id. para. 71. In recent cases,
ECtHR based the decisions in which it declined jurisdiction for acts outside the territory
of Member States not on territorial grounds. See, e.g., Saddam Hussein v. Albania and
others, App. No. 23276/04, Court Decision on Inadmissibility (Mar. 14, 2006), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72789; Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App.
No. 78166/01, Grand Chamber Decision on Admissibility (May 2, 2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80830. International law here developed in an
opposite way to U.S. law. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993).
106 For example, the United States expanded the range of recognized claims to include
persecution on account of gang violence. But see the 2018 executive branch decision
that made it much harder to seek asylum based on gang violence, Matter of A-B-, 27 I &
N Dec. 316, 320–23 (A.G. 2018).
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By constructing a regime that guarantees universal exit but no
corresponding entry duty, the law has abandoned “entry” refugees
permanently stuck in transitional locations, such as refugee camps or
territorial borderlands.
The Syrian woman I mentioned above leaves the sympathetic
viewer thinking that she deserves our care. The genuine sympathy
evoked obscures any analysis of the responsibility of the law for her
predicament in the first place. This woman went to sea so she could get
into a host state and use her access to create a legal right for protection.
Significantly, my point is not that entry claims are not susceptible
to adjudication. Rather, that they require a further level of political
treaty negotiation to assign an entry right to specific duty-holders.
Without an agreed-upon framework that spells out how courts should
distribute entry obligations, these claims do not lend themselves to
adjudication. They leave courts moving ad hoc, resolving underlying
normative questions about who is most vulnerable and who is most
capable of providing protection. At the moment, courts do so by
drawing on variants of physical access to compromise between the
interests of the non-national and the state. But this compromise leaves
access doing most of the work in the allocation of protection. Alas,
access is a bad proxy for the real, substantive conflict between
individual non-nationals and states over whom to protect, in what order
of priority to protect, and by whom they should be protected. And,
furthermore, access also leaves those individuals who fail to establish
such physical presence figures of abjection; they remain objects of
humanitarian sympathy more than bearers of legal rights.
V. CONCLUSION
At the present moment, the world faces a massive crisis of mobility.
I have sought to bring human rights and refugee law into the frame of
normative consideration by exploring the structural gaps in these
regimes when addressing this crisis. These laws defer to the sovereign
control of national borders and assume that individuals are already
‘within’ states. They forgo mobility as formative.
Operating within this state-centric frame, current legal practice
conditions the protection of refugees on (i) the definition of a “refugee”
and (ii) the right of non-refoulment. But I have argued that this formal
legal practice blurs the difference between two sub-sets of refugees and
the claims they make on the law, and also obscures the looseness of
obligation under human rights and refugee law.
To illuminate the slippery nature of these obligations, I have
introduced a new taxonomy that differentiates between two types of
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refugee claims on the law: continuity-based claims and entry-based
claims. This taxonomy divides refugees by the nature of the claims they
make and differentiates between two separate normative impulses:
stability or “stasis” (guaranteeing the right of an individual to remain or
to return to where she belongs, territorially, sociologically, politically, or
emotionally), and mobility (protecting the right of an individual facing
harm to leave where she belongs and to enter to another state).
Furthermore, this taxonomy also separates refugees on the basis of the
duty-holder against whom they are making their claims for protection:
“own country,” or “any country but own country,” and distinguishes
between the duty not to deport and the duty to admit.
Drawing on an analysis of the human right to freedom of
movement, I have further suggested that human rights law developed in
a way that understands rights in terms of continuity—i.e., belonging to
a national state. It finds justice and fairness inside one’s own state. But
this evolution does not fit the current political reality. Most refugees
today are making claims motivated by entry. For them, justice and
fairness lie in fleeing their “own state” and settling in another. In their
cases, human rights and refugee law create clear rights, but they do not
point at any obvious duty-holders. And so, all states are free to treat the
rights of such refugees as someone else’s duty. This leaves these
regimes less and less relevant to the reality on the ground.
There are practical implications for states of this gap between the
law and the empirical reality. Those states that resist participating in
refugee protection today, like Hungary or Poland, may want to consider
how small the vision of human rights and refugee law really is. Looking
past the rhetoric of rights, both the human rights and refugee regimes
in fact ask very little of states. They do not create an entry duty and
instead acquiesce to state control over their borders. And those states
that declare their adherence to human rights and refugee law might well
consider that the real engine of today’s refugee crisis inheres in the lack
of entry. Without taking this challenge head on, regardless of their
commitments to international law, they are already on the way towards
the practice of Hungary or Poland.
Further, for those who are committed to the protection of refugees,
it is worthwhile to acknowledge the misfit between the legal regime and
the reality on the ground: without a further level of treaty negotiations
to make entry-rights actionable against specific states, refugee law, first,
fails on its own terms because it does not achieve what it sets out to do—
namely, to protect the most vulnerable. Second, it comes up short as a
matter of principle because it allocates privileges and duties arbitrarily.
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In embracing an access-based compromise that awards
consideration for protection on the basis of claimant location, human
rights courts and treaty bodies might have actually compounded this
inadequacy of refugee law. By linking human rights protections to the
ability to establish a territorial presence in the state (strong
territoriality) or to come within the effective control of the state or its
agents (neo-territoriality), these human rights enforcement institutions
have effectively reduced the pressure on the international refugee
regime to achieve more structural reforms. And, at the same time, these
adjudicative bodies may have also obstructed us from recognizing as
rights holders those refugees who fail to establish access. Instead,
before they reach our shores—through the desert, across the ocean, or
over the wall—we more readily identify them as subjects of sympathy.
Facing a global crisis of mobility, it is vital to directly tackle the
question of entry. This could entail building further on the work already
started by leading scholars to reorient the international community
away from the refugee paradigm and toward a new global legal
framework, a law of migration,107 or towards criminal law to enforce the
rights of refugees and migrants.108 Such frames should not be limited to
the possibility of a presumptive right to migrate, broad liberal
commitments to freedom of movement, and the doctrinal avenue of
“crimes against humanity” to create individual criminal liability for
border violence. Given the lack of an entry I traced in this Article, they
must also articulate the duties of states. More specifically, how would
lines be drawn around individuals who must receive maximal
protection under the law, and by whom?109 In addition, advocates of this
shift away from the structure of refugee law must also reckon with the
risk of losing universal consent to this elaborate body of law.110
Given that current political trends do not support progress toward
a universal entry duty, an alternative avenue forward is to craft rights
to entry through a legal regime that seeks to obtain state consent. A
107 There is mushrooming new work here, e.g., Symposium on Mapping Global
Migration Law, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 504 (2017).
108 For discussion, including sources, see Itamar Mann, The New Impunity: Border
Violence as Crime., 42 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3548181.
109 Some of the questions that are relevant: (1) what is the level of negotiations (who
participates), and degree of transparency, (2) who will allow entry and to whom and to
how many, and (3) what will be the role of law (if at all).
110 James Hathaway is associated with this view. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, Moving
Beyond the Asylum Muddle, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
moving-beyond-the-asylum-muddle/ (“The moment has come not to renegotiate the
Refugee Convention, but rather at long last to operationalize the treaty in a way that
works dependably, and fairly.”).
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number of structures are possible that would expand a right to entry
conditional upon prior state authorization, and I list here some
examples. (1) International: create agreed upon entry duties by
galvanizing state commitments to combat certain global ills, such as
those that are climate- or inequality-related (e.g., resettlement
programs). This entry derives from politics, not adjudication, and, if
granted, is an exceptional act of sovereign grace. (2) Regional: entry
obligations within smaller communities of states as a function of
consensual agreements among them (see intra-regional free movement
arrangements such as the European Union, the Economic Community of
West African States, and the Southern Common Market MERCOSUR).
This entry inheres in a legal duty and operates irrespective of state
consent after signing the original agreement. (3) State: entry that is
rooted in the explicit recognition of certain values by individual states;
for example, a state voluntarily allocating entry to advance diversity
(e.g., U.S. diversity VISA lottery).
Of course, it is impossible to predict the efficacy of any of these
structures. It might turn out that ad hoc mechanisms tailored to specific
states or regions might carry adverse consequences for some sub-sets
of refugees. For example, states could select in favor of refugees who
come from particular locations (for example, regions closer to Europe),
or a favored religion (Jewish refugees going to Israel,111 or Christians
going to predominantly Christian states), or particular features or skills
(athletes, doctors).112 Such considerations could trump the gravity of an
individual’s predicament. In addition, entry that is a function of an ad
hoc unilateral state action always remains tenuous and could be
reversed at will.
In a legal reality that accords the state monopoly over human
mobility, however, shifting focus from a universal normative frame to
ad hoc mechanisms that are tailored to address interests of specific
states might nonetheless provide better protective outcomes. Such
interests could include expanding and diversifying labor, growing the
state’s tax base, mitigating the effect of an aging population, and
incorporating young men into the market instead of leaving them at the
border. This approach would encourage the state to take in more

111 In 1950, Israel passed the Law of Return securing the right of “Every Jew . . . to
come to the State of Israel as an immigrant,” (“oleh”) and, in 1952, it passed the Law of
Nationality, making “[e]very immigrant in the sense of the Law of Return of 1950 . . . an
Israeli citizen.” In these twin laws, Israel exercised its discretion as a state to permit
entry for Jews. Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.), art. 1; Nationality
Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1950), art. 2.
112 SHACHAR, supra note 96.
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individuals in absolute numbers, but give the state agency over who
these individuals are.
Finally, and significantly, this does not mean abandoning refugee
law and human rights completely. Instead, individual non-nationals
may want to tailor their protective strategy according to the nature of
their claim. Those who can incorporate into their claim for protection
elements of continuity with one specific state are well-advised to draw
on strategies of human rights adjudication. In fact, they may press on
international enforcement bodies to expand the scope of legal
belonging. In doing so, they can defer to existing international case law.
For example, they may begin with the Nottebohm precedent that claims
to having a home, rather than a formal legal-political allegiance, can
define nationality.
From Nottebohm, they could also consider
incorporating more proxies for continuity, such as historical (again see
the precedent of a “Jewish National Home”); religious (e.g., Gambia
welcomed Muslim refugees from Myanmar); linguistic (Canada
privileges immigrants who can speak French), etc. And, furthermore,
they could use these proxies to imagine thicker degrees of protection,
including not only one or two functions (remain and return), but also
three functions (return, remain, and nationality). My point here is not
to flesh out new legal claims that can pass muster, but rather to gesture
toward the broad range of ways that an individual can assert before
courts that she belongs “enough” to gain protection.
For those refugees, in contrast, who cannot make a continuitybased claim, a legal path forward requires climbing towering walls,
crossing dry deserts, and taking dangerous boat journeys so that they
can establish presence and petition for entry into a host state. Yet, most
refugees who ask for entry—the vast majority of refugees today—are
unable to establish such access. Absent a further level of political treaty
negotiations that explicitly targets the question of an entry duty, human
rights and refugee law are less and less relevant to their reality on the
ground. Juridical principles in a formal sense permit states to declare
their (superficial) adherence to human rights and refugee rights. But
they abandon those refugees who ask for entry and are unable to
establish access. Their pleas are lost in the legal maze.

